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ABSTRACT  
Purpose − The aim of this paper is to find the factors affecting the post-contest success 
and failure of prizewinners of business plan competitions (BPC). 
Design/methodology/approach – An explanatory research using combined approach of 
Likert survey, media research and interviews was conducted to find the factors affecting 
the success or failure of the prizewinners of Ajujaht start-up competition. 
Findings –Issues with the business model, age, experience, dedication and choosing the 
right partners are identifiable as factors of success and failure. Problems with outside 
expertise was a factor for failure, whereas successful prizewinners were actively looking 
for investments. These factors are not inherent to Ajujaht projects, but Ajujaht may have 
its role in the failure of these startups. 
Practical implications – As an opportunity to learn from past mistakes; it highlights the 
factors that new start-up founders should consider when working on their project. It also 
offers the organizers of BPCs some key points to focus on during their evaluation process 
and for investors to consider when planning investments.  
Originality/value − This paper contributes to the existing, but insufficient literature on 
BPC prizewinners. This paper explores currently active start-up companies. It offers an 
approach for defining success. It provides potential negative factors that the participants 
of BPCs may encounter after competition.  
Keywords − business plan competition, mixed method, entrepreneurship, start-up 
companies.  
Paper type – Mixed method study.  
CERCS – S189, S190 
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INTRODUCTION 
Start-ups draw attention: discussions about what start-ups are, what they do and what they 
offer for general public emerge periodically. As the wider audience further acknowledges 
the start-up industry, entrepreneurial competitions for business plans and fresh ideas have 
become globally widespread over the last decade, with participants getting benefits 
without much to lose. 
Previous research has shown that pitch competitions help entrepreneurs learn, which in 
turn increases the likelihood of success (Howell 2016), public exposure, potential 
investors, validation and funding. McKenzie (2016) claims that BPCs enable firms to get 
more capital and workers, without negative effects on business networks, mentors, self-
efficacy, or uses of other sources of finance. He explains that winning  allows firms to 
overcome credit constraints by using capital grants to purchase more capital inputs, hire 
more labour, and use this to produce more varied inputs. This corresponds with Cooper 
et al (1994), who find that firm survival and growth are limited by initial financial capital, 
and Carpenter and Petersen (2002), who conclude that the growth of small firms can be 
limited by internal finance. However, McKenzie and Sansone (2019) find that business 
plan scores from judges, in other words results in these competitions, do not correlate 
with business survival, employment, sales, or profits three years later. Tipu (2019) 
reviewed academic literature on BPCs in developed and emerging economies and 
indicated a need to focus more on BPCs. He proposes questions for future research, one 
of which is: „Do the winning and/or losing teams continue to develop the idea and 
eventually initiate the venture?” (Tipu 2019:94) — a question that partially, among 
others, this paper seeks to answer.  
The follow-ups of competition-winning start-ups show varying performance history; 
competition results do not lead to definitive success. Nevertheless, successful companies 
have launched from BPCs, showing that due to the early exposure and attention BPCs 
offer, winning can lead to success. Still, researches on entrepreneurial competitions are 
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scarce. Estonia’s biggest entrepreneurship competition Ajujaht concluded for the 13th 
time in the spring of 2020. The whole groundwork for the paper started out of a notion 
that the contestants of Ajujaht rise into the media spotlight every spring, but fade away 
soon after. Of all the contestants throughout the history of this competition, only few 
companies have remained in the public sight. This raised a hypothesis that there is a set 
or sets of factors that negatively affect the ensuing progress of Ajujaht participants after 
the competition’s finale. As the overall predictive power for picking competition winners 
is weak for different approaches (McKenzie and Sansone 2019), this paper is less with 
predictive inclination and more a retrospective. The aim of this paper is to explore factors 
affecting post-competition failure or success of Ajujaht competition prizewinners. 
Surveys and interviews with key people in top three companies from years 2008 to 2014 
have been conducted to see if there are any specific factors that played for and against the 
success of these businesses.  
The paper proceeds as follows: Section 1 is a literature review that points out the possible 
factors of success and failure following the competition. Section 2 describes the empirical 
approach and the sample. Section 3 contains the results, discussion and conclusion.  
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1. LITERATURE REVIEW 
1.1. Possible factors of business success and failure 
Successful entrepreneurship is a complex phenomenon and both internal and external 
factors impact on business performance. However, the first question is, what to consider 
as a successful or unsuccessful business? Academic literature provides different forms 
for success: survival (e.g. Lussier and Pfeifer 2001), profit (e.g. Lussier and Halabi 2010), 
longevity (e.g. van Praag 2003), sales growth (e.g. Smallbone & Wyer 2000), number of 
employees (van Praag 1996) and many more. There are also many definitions of failure. 
Perhaps the simplest is the one of Merriam-Webster, where failure is considered lack of 
success (Failure – Merriam-Webster 2020). Gilad et al (1985) interpret failure in business 
as a situation where perceived future gains are lower than the effort of staying in business 
(Gilad et al 1985 via Salminen 2012). It is possible to interpret failure as something 
continuous; as a business process based on a cycle of trial and error (Stokes and 
Blackburn 2002). This paper avoids the narrow conception of failure as bankruptcy or 
liquidation (Peat 2007) and conflates two interpretations: firstly, failure as the termination 
of a business that has fallen short of its goals (McGrath 1999; Politis and Gabrielsson 
2009), and secondly, failure as a loss of capital and an inability to “make a go of it” 
(Cochran 1981). This conflicts with Headd (2003), who claims that when defining failure, 
it is vital not to conflate failure with business closure, as this may involve voluntary 
venture termination for reasons like retirement or pursuing other activities.  
With small new ventures, the founder’s influence in defining business concept and mode 
of operation is of paramount importance (Watson, Hogarth‐Scott and Wilson 1998). As 
the founder’s influence to the principals of a business is singular, especially in founding 
stages, it is difficult not to agree with. Albeit the entrepreneur’s psychology is more 
important in predicting chances of starting a business than in business being successful 
(Rauch and Frese 2000), there are multiple reviews that suggest a relationship between 
personality traits and both business creation and business success (Chell, Haworth and 
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Brearley 1991; Cooper and Gimeno-Gascon 1992; Rauch and Frese 2000). It was already 
the personal qualities of a Schumpeterian entrepreneur, such as intelligence, alertness, 
thrive and determination, that were important in terms of the ability to innovate 
(Schumpeter 1934). Martin (1999) identified traits that are most frequently associated 
with the success of the entrepreneurs: creativity, positiveness, problem-solving, 
persistence, need for independence, self-confidence, and high-risk propensity, which all 
reflect the Schumpeterian qualities for innovation, further emphasizing the connection 
between innovation, entrepreneurship and success. 
Rauch and Frese (2007) showed traits which were correlated with business success: 
innovativeness, proactive personality and self-efficacy, while stress tolerance was 
consistently related to business creation. Self-efficacy and proactiveness suggest that 
successful entrepreneurs may occasionally come out as overconfident, perhaps even 
arrogant. Ciavarella et al (2004) claim that out of “Big Five” personality attributes, only 
entrepreneur’s conscientiousness was positively related to long-term venture survival, but 
a negative relationship between entrepreneur’s openness and long-term venture survival 
was also found.  
Vivek Wadhwa of Carnegie Mellon University and Harvard Law surmises that BPCs do 
not produce winning businesses (Wadhwa 2009). According Wadhwa (2009): „losing in 
a business plan contest is actually more beneficial than winning”. He suggests that BPC 
winners may be influenced by praise that comes too early and too easily, and abstain from 
putting in the persevering effort to make the business work in the long term. Instead, those 
who are initially seen as having room for improvement, seem to perform better than their 
peers in the long term. He highlights some crucial factors that could be part of „winner’s 
curse “: a lack of solid understanding of market needs and missing real-world validation 
of the ideas. (Ibid 2009) 
The study of Duchesneau and Gartner (1990) found that lead entrepreneurs in successful 
firms worked long hours. Van Gelderen et al (2005) shows the decision to switch from 
part-time to full-time may be grounded on clear indications that the entrepreneur can 
indeed start the business. The decision of either working full- or part-time may indicate 
entrepreneur’s determination. The association with success of starting part-time or full-
time appears to be a circular finding; the amount of time one can put in is a success 
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measure by itself. The aspect of motivation is also addressed: Push motivation works 
negatively in combination with high ambitions. If forced to start a business, and on the 
lookout for organizational employment, it is better to start an operation limited in scope 
and scale. (Ibid 2005) Duchesneau and Gartner (1990) found that entrepreneurs with 
bigger ambitions are more successful. Hodgetts and Kuratko (2000) found that being 
independent, creative and doing enjoyable work relate to survival of small firms. 
Knight (1967) and Drucker (1985) claimed entrepreneurship to be about taking risk. 
Boermans and Willebrands (2017) found a connection between risk propensity and 
success and claim that those with low risk perception and high-risk propensity perform 
the worst. People who perceive less risk start their business earlier, whether their risk 
perception is accurate or not (Van Gelderen et al 2005). Based on this, the author suggests 
that low risk perception leads to rushed business decisions that in turn may prove 
detrimental to company’s future.  
One key for start-up success is finding sufficient financial resources to develop an idea, 
especially in phase when the start-up does not generate revenue. Because of this, start-
ups must look for financial resources from the external environment: family, friends, 
banks, venture and, development capital, state support, or crowdfunding. (Bednár and 
Tarišková 2017) Nascent entrepreneurs intending to use more start-up capital have lower 
probabilities to get their business running. Amount of intended start-up capital relates to 
intended size; smaller companies are easier to get started. (Van Gelderen et al 2005) 
Howell (2016) studied ventures sector-wise and found software and education ventures 
more likely to succeed in raising angel or venture capital (VC) and growing staff, while 
social and biotech ventures not. Media and entertainment ventures were more likely to 
only raise angel/venture capital. (Howell 2016) 
Studies of BPCs show that team characteristics may influence results in BPC. There are 
some gender-related differences in venture outcomes. Poczter and Shapsis (2016) show 
that women generally receive lower valuations and less capital than men do and that it is 
partly because women initially ask for less. There is evidence that outside investors who 
observe women doing better on the Shark Tank televised pitching show (i.e., receiving 
more offers) are less likely to approach them relative to their male counterparts (Smith 
and Viceisza 2017). Ibid (2017) claim that in Shark Tank, teams with greater proportion 
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of women receive more offers during the negotiation process but are less likely to exist 
in the longer run (relative to teams with a comparable proportion of men and offers). 
Poczter and Shapsis (2016) found that women-owned teams receive lower company 
valuations and less capital than their male counterparts, partly because women initially 
ask for less. They also found that the likelihood of a team receiving an offer from an angel 
investor is still independent of the entrepreneurs’ gender. (Poczter and Shapsis 2016)  
Smith and Viceisza (2017) noticed that larger teams often have proportionally more 
women, suggesting women are less likely to pitch or work alone. Kolvereid (1996) and 
Mazzarol et al. (1999) found that men over women were more likely to be founders of 
new business. Walters, Stuhlmacher and Meyer (1998) show that females value 
cooperation more than males and exhibit more cooperative behaviour. More contestants 
pitching for the same team are likely to be more effective; team members tend to 
remediate mutual weaknesses. Specifically, the number of people pitching and their 
attractiveness are determinants of an intention-to-fund. (Smith and Viceisza 2017). The 
likelihood of quitting start-up efforts decreases with organization size (Carroll and 
Hannan 2000). Firms with more than one shareholder during initiation were significantly 
more likely to survive (Lechler and Gemuenden 1999; Westhead et al. 1995). Chatman 
and Flynn (2001) say that communication issues diminish over time as team members get 
used to working with one another. The problem is that the team might disband before it 
can work through these differences (Williams and O’Reilly 1998).  
On the subject of reviewed literature, some contradictory findings are highlighted in 
Table 1. The author acknowledges the connection between traits and success might not 
always be discernible. Entrepreneur’s personality might not make for an easy prediction 
of firm success (Storey 1994); Gadenne (1998) is more sceptical: entrepreneur’s personal 
characteristics are not related to successful management. These concepts are opposed by 
multiple papers. The existence of entrepreneurial traits affecting business success has 
been repeatedly discussed, in different contexts and cultures. In the matter of whether 
connections exist or not, the sheer volume of findings leads the author to take the position 
of the majority. 
Studies on previous entrepreneurship experience have had varying results. Cassar (2014) 
made a jury-related observation, finding no support for start-up experience, whether 
 
 
11 
 
within the industry or otherwise, improving entrepreneur forecast performance. This 
suggests that better prediction of new business performance is achieved by those with 
industry, but not entrepreneurial, experience (Cassar 2014). Cooper et al (1994) and 
Azoulay et al (2018) claim that industry experience relates to success. Van Gelderen et 
al (2005) confirm that those with limited entrepreneurial experience benefit from 
information and guidance. Corbett (2007), Raman (2004), Cliff et al (2006) and 
Wijewardena and Cooray (1996) attribute experiences a significant importance. 
Agnieszka and Mackiewicz (2020) claim that diverse educational and professional 
backgrounds raise the chances of starting a company and entrepreneurial success.  
Table 1. Contradictory findings in reviewed literature 
 
Author Findings Topic Findings Author 
e.g. Rauch and 
Frese 2007; 
Ciavarella et al 
2004 
Entrepreneur’s 
traits strongly 
correlated with 
business success 
Importance 
of traits 
Ostensible relations between 
entrepreneur’s personality 
and firm success 
Storey 1994; 
Gadenne 
1998 
Gottschalk et al 
2014,  
Venture outcomes 
are unrelated to 
prior successful 
entrepreneurial 
experience 
Previous 
experience 
Education and prior 
experience in business are 
critical success factors; 
individuals with more 
diverse educational and 
professional backgrounds 
have greater chances of 
starting a company and it 
being successful. 
e.g. Raman 
2004; 
Wijewardena 
and Cooray 
1996; 
Kurczewska 
and 
Mackiewicz 
2020 
Tipu and Arain 
2011; Chrisman 
and McMullan 
2004; 
Duchesneau 
and Gartner 
1990 
Positive 
relationship 
between venture 
survival and 
seeking support 
from an outside 
expert 
Outside 
experts 
“There are several studies 
that show weak, zero or even 
negative correlation between 
taking start-up courses or 
counselling, and successfully 
launching and/or running a 
business on the other” 
Davidsson 
2002: 6 
 
Headd 2003; 
Van Gelderen et 
al 2005; 
Brockhaus 
1980, Prasad et 
al 2015 
Young owners 
considered more 
successful at 
closure; 
older people were 
less likely to get 
the business 
started; younger 
considered more 
successful; 
Young vs 
old 
founders 
Students/younger founders 
more likely to abandon the 
business idea; average age of 
founders for high-growth 
ventures is usually >40; 
older BPC applicants more 
likely to be running firms 
among the non-winners, and 
to run more successful firms. 
Howell 2016; 
Azoulay et al 
2018; 
McKenzie 
and Sansone 
2019; Prasad 
et al (2015) 
Brockhaus 1980 
Those with an 
internal locus of 
control are more 
successful in their 
business ventures. 
Locus of 
control 
Successful entrepreneurs 
believe in having less control 
over success in business 
(external locus of control) 
Duchesneau 
and Gartner 
1990 
 
Source: Compiled by the author. 
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Gottschalk et al (2014) found that venture outcomes are unrelated to prior successful 
entrepreneurial experience but once failed, the entrepreneur is more likely to fail again. 
The author recognizes that although the panel study of Gottschalk et al (2014) was large-
scale (8400 German entrepreneurs), the results are not confirmed by other studies. As 
most start-ups in this paper came up with an idea that is extensive in the amount of 
research and knowledge required, the influence of previous experience, either in field or 
managing, is expected to be of significant importance. In addition, higher entrepreneurial 
or technical education is seen as a critical business success factor (Wijewardena and 
Cooray 1996; Indarti and Langenberg 2004). 
Drucker (1985) noted that the most plausible reason for high failure rates of start-ups is 
simple: most people do not know what they are doing. New ventures should compensate 
knowledge gaps by using the support of outside experts, as it benefits firm survival (Tipu 
and Arain 2011; Chrisman and McMullan 2004, Duchesneau and Gartner 1990), 
emphasizing the relevance of Ajujaht as a support system for nascent entrepreneurs. 
Davidsson (2002) contradicts; but when closely inspecting Davidsson’s (2002) claim on 
counselling and success, one can see that he mainly refers to his own previous research. 
The underlying causes for his results might come from the boom of entrepreneurship 
assistance industry in the early 1990s; which resulted in questionable assistance quality 
(Davidsson 2002b via Chrisman and McMullan 2004:230). 
The age of founder has been studied repeatedly, giving mixed results. Headd (2003) 
concluded that young owners were common in businesses considered successful at 
closure. Among nascent entrepreneurs showing limited ambition, older people were less 
likely to get the business started (Van Gelderen et al 2005). Howell (2016) found 
somewhat opposite results in the context of entrepreneurial competition: students and 
younger founders are more responsive to the option to abandon the business idea. Prasad 
et al (2015) found a negative relationship between entrepreneur age and performance for 
“innovative” ventures; Azoulay et al (2018) found that the average age of high-growth 
venture founders is >40, the exact number depending on followed criteria. McKenzie and 
Sansone (2019) found that older BPC applicants were more likely to be running firms 
after the competition among the non-winners, and to run bigger firms, but several 
attributes that were predictive for non-winners, were much less predictive of outcomes 
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for winners. Based on this literature review, the author has no expectations on age-related 
differences in success/failure results. It is clear that this matter needs further research.  
The author identified a gap between Duchesneau and Gartner’s (1990) and Brockhaus’ 
(1980) results on locus of control. Duchesneau and Gartner (1990) claim successful 
entrepreneurs to believe in having less control over success in business. Analysis of 
Duchesneau and Gartner (1990) highlights a conflict in their study results, as successful 
entrepreneurs are found to mitigate risks more, but feel less in charge of the results. Raises 
a question: if the locus of control is external for successful entrepreneurs, why still 
mitigate the risks? The results of Brockhaus (1980), where the locus of control of 
successful entrepreneurs is significantly more internal, links to the findings of Ciavarella 
et al (2014), as people deemed as conscientious are also perceived less risky. This leads 
the author to favour the position of Brockhaus (1980).  
Although there are numerous publications on the factors of success, these rarely provide 
a holistic approach to success and failure.  Furthermore, business failures and causes for 
start-up failure in particular are less common in modern literature. Still, few publications 
exist; these are explored in the next chapter.  
1.2. The results of ex-post studies on start-up failure 
On the subject of start-ups’ performance, few recent ex-post studies highlight the causes 
of failure. Although studies are scarce, the number of published datasets is even smaller. 
Importantly, the causes of failures are not sole causes; companies may have had multiple 
causes, which is why the percentage rates do not add up to 100%. A summarised chart of 
causes is presented in Figure 1. 
One of the most broad-based studies of start-ups’ failures is by CB Insights, a tech market 
intelligence platform that analyses data points on VC, start-ups, patents, partnerships. 
Their dataset includes 300+ start-up post-mortems. Economics papers, blogs and business 
websites usually refer to CB Insights’ research results when compiling their top list of 
failure causes. As a side note, blogs and sites often present CB Insights’ research results 
as their own. Their study identified the most common cause of failure among start-ups is 
the missing necessity for the product/service (42%), which meaning the start-ups solved 
problems that did not serve the market need. It damages the product/service and the 
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success of the business model. Marc Andreessen (2007) has defined product/market fit 
as being in a good market with a product that can satisfy that market. 
 
 
Figure 1. Compiled causes of start-ups’ failures. 
Source: (The TOP 20… 2019, Cantamessa et al 2018, Bednár and Tarišková 2017), compiled 
by the author 
0% 5% 10% 15% 20% 25% 30% 35% 40% 45%
Unfaithful customers
Product did not evolve with the market
Loss of the original vision
Not technically feasible/sustainable
Problems in customer aquisition
Too many competitors
No traction
Failure to pivot
Did not use networking
Failed geographical expansion
Wrong customer development
No/wrong scaling
Lack of funding
Burned out
Wrong positioning in the market
Few customers
Pivot went wrong
Political/Economical/Legal challenges
Bad organisation/management
Mistimed product
Focus lost
Poor marketing
Lack of passion/motivation
Co-founder disharmony
Ignored customers
Lack of business development
Product not satisfactory
Investors not found
Pricing/cost issues
Outcompeted
Problems with team
No/wrong business model
Ran out of money
No need for product/service
Causes of start-ups' failures
Bednár & Tarišková (2017) Cantamessa et al (2018) CB Insights (2019)
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On the opposite, wrong positioning implies wrong knowledge of the product/service with 
consequent bad performance or the risk to begin in the “stuck in the middle” position of 
Porter’s generic strategies (Porter 1980). Missing product/market fit was followed by 
running out of money (29%) and not having the right team (23%) (The TOP 20… 2019), 
the last of which is linked with Smith and Viceisza’s (2017) results.  
Cantamessa et al (2018) use compiled data from CB Insights’ cases and from 
Autopsy.io’s restricted database of failures. Although similar results with CB Insights’ 
findings could be expected, that is not the case. Their study shows the wrong or missing 
business model as the most frequent cause of start-up failure (35%). Business model 
describes how organisation offers value for customers and captures part of it to generate 
profits (Osterwalder and Pigneur 2010). Although a basis for value creation, firms need 
to change it as the core logic for operating a firm changes over time in order to stay 
profitable (Linder and Cantrell 2000). The right model is rarely clear early on in 
new/innovative sectors: entrepreneurs who have a good—although an imperfect business 
model—but who are pro-learning and can make it evolve, are more likely to succeed 
(Shirky 2008; Teece 2000). 28% of the observed start-ups listed poor business 
development as a cause for their breakdown. The highly technical teams show that 
focusing on the product is a risk to have a lack of business development, which leads to 
the absence of commercial perspective. This means sub-par studies on increasing 
customers, sales and profits, and on how to make the business more profitable and self-
perpetuating. 21% of observed start-ups ran out of money. Missing product/market fit 
was a factor for 18% of participants. followed by bad organisation/management (14%).  
(Ibid 2018)  
Compared to Cantamessa et al (2018) and CB Insights’ studies, the study of Bednár and 
Tarišková highlighted significantly less factors. (2017).  Ibid (2017) also uses 
Autopsy.io’s data, and also differs from both CB Insights’ and of Cantamessa et al (2018) 
in results. They highlight insufficient funds as the most common (34%) cause of failure. 
In over 1/3 of analysed start-ups, companies had not defined sufficiently the amount of 
funds needed for the launch and for the investment time schedule. They noted that some 
did not reach the sales stage and obtain additional financial resources from customers. 
Scant funds led to other problems: reimbursement of capital expenditures, financing of 
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expansion, covering operating costs for staff, offices, infrastructure, etc, and covering 
other costs. The second biggest problem was the missing customer interest for the start-
up’s solution or alternatively, no product/market fit (28%). The start-up founders defined 
this problem as insufficient real market testing. They had met with customers and asked 
about problems, analysed solutions. However, when the product launched, they found out 
that people, despite previously claiming they were interested, really did not want to buy 
it. (Bednár and Tarišková 2017) 
Third most common cause was the lack of investors (16%). The reasons for it can either 
be that the start-ups have hurt its investors several times and failed to fulfil the required 
goals in the basic series, thereby losing confidence, or by not producing evidence to 
convince the investor of its exponential growth potential (pre-contract with buyers, a large 
number of applications downloads, sales, success in the crowdfunding campaign, etc.), 
or the shortcomings of the business model from the investor perspective, or insufficient 
investor awareness of all issues or simply lacking understanding between the start-up 
team and the investor. The incomplete cost calculations were a cause for 1/6 of the firms. 
In such cases, founders did not make accurate finance plans that included direct and 
overhead expenses. Incorrectly defined costs resulted in incorrect price formation and 
therefore the market price did not cover costs. (Bednár and Tarišková 2017) 
The literature on business success and failure has identified a number of different factors 
affecting the success and failure of businesses. Although the literature is reasonably 
extensive, it provides a fragmented picture on influential factors. In broad perspective, it 
has a reasonable explanation. To comprehend the scope of respective studies, researches 
have to make certain choices on study design, which in turn leads to more detailed, but 
narrowed results. It also reflects on the outcomes of ex-post studies on start-up failure, 
where different methodology and use of databases provides different results. The 
methodology of this paper is discussed in Section 2. 
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2. METHODOLOGY, DATA AND RESEARCH SUBJECTS 
2.1. Methodology and data 
The methodology for this study involves a mixed method approach. Creswell and Plano 
Clark (2006) define mixed methods research as a research design with philosophical 
assumptions as well as methods of inquiry. It involves philosophical assumptions that 
guide the direction of data collection and analysis and the mixture of qualitative and 
quantitative data in a single study or studies. The combined use of different approaches 
provides a better understanding of research problems than either approach alone. (Ibid 
2006) Although quantitative research dominates in business research, mixed methods 
have now become established as a legitimate methodological choice and utilised by 
researchers from a variety of disciplines (Cameron and Molina-Azorin 2011).  
 
 
Figure 2. Mixed method — triangulation design, convergence model. 
Source: Creswell and Plano Clark (2006: 63) 
The traditional or convergence model of a mixed methods triangulation design (Figure 2) 
involves the researcher in collecting and analysing quantitative and qualitative data 
separately on the same phenomenon, followed by the convergence of results during 
interpretation. Researchers use it for comparing results or validating, corroborating or 
confirming quantitative results with qualitative discoveries. The purpose of this model is 
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to find valid, well-substantiated conclusions on a phenomenon. (Creswell and Plano Clark 
2006) 
As Ajujaht concluded its 13th season, numerous projects have taken part in Ajujaht 
throughout the years. BPCs explicitly try to select entrepreneurs with the best growth 
prospects, so that any comparison of winners and losers is likely to overstate the effects 
of the program due to selection bias (McKenzie 2016). This is why all ideas or companies 
discussed here are considered as winners, and achieved top three places in their 
participation year. The selection of the final applicable Ajujaht season for this paper 
derives from the study of Hechavarria et al (2016), who found that, in average, a start-up 
reaches some kind of outcome in 46 months or nearly four years. The latest newest 
business reports for all companies were from 2018 at the time of writing, therefore it is 
necessary having data for at least four complete financial years after their participation in 
Ajujaht, which means the most recent participants in this study are from 2014, season 7.  
The prerequisite of interpreting possible findings is to determine whether these Ajujaht 
projects/ideas/teams/companies (used as equivalents throughout the next chapters) have 
failed or succeeded. This paper avoids the narrow conception of failure as bankruptcy or 
liquidation (Peat 2007) and follows interpretations of failure as the termination of a 
business that has fallen short of its goals (McGrath 1999; Politis and Gabrielsson 2009), 
and failure as a loss of capital and an inability to “make a go of it” (Cochran 1981). Brush 
and Vanderwerf (1992) claim that growth is the most appropriate indicator of surviving 
small-medium enterprises (SME’s) performance. In addition, according to Pasanen 
(2003): „survival and growth may be the most appropriate measures of success in small 
firms.” Based on this, business success is considered in this paper as the status of 
continuously operating a start-up with a growth in sales over the last 3 years. A successful 
start-up must, in the context of this paper, meet the following criteria:  
• The idea must have been developed into a company; 
• the project must be ongoing or must have offered its founders a successful exit;  
• the core idea of the start-up must have remained the same over time; 
• that service or product has generated increasing revenue for last 3 years. 
 
 
19 
 
Due to the small number of subjects and for the sake of comparison, the subjects are 
classified as either successful or failed. As definitions of success often depend on context 
and perspective, the selection of success criteria came down to the context of this study 
and publicly available data. In general, the criteria reflect how well the teams have put 
their presented ideas into life. The reasoning behind the first criterion is that ideas need a 
business platform on which to prosper on, therefore the teams must have founded a 
company with a purpose of pursuing their Ajujaht idea. Most did it, some stopped right 
after Ajujaht.  
A wide-used conception of business success comprises of its survival. As businesses are 
generally founded either with a goal of long-term success or a successful exit, successful 
projects should not have ended prematurely, which is why start-ups in the paper must still 
be actively developed or must have offered its founders a successful exit.  
The idea’s success could not be discussed without observing the continuity of the idea in 
the business process. Although business angels and venture capitalists have emphasized 
the importance of good teams in company development, the core idea and its effectuation 
were what led the Ajujaht teams to their initial success. In this paper, the core idea 
involves a service/product and a goal that are at least similar to the idea presented during 
Ajujaht. To exemplify, Click & Grow’s change of emphasis from a providing smart 
gardens to providing pods for their smart gardens is not considered as a change in core 
idea, it still serves the aim to provide people with fresh produce. Virtual Garden’s change 
from a gardening platform to a consulting company is a change in the core idea of their 
business.  
The revenue growth is the quantifiable criterion for evaluating success for small 
businesses/start-ups. Paul Graham, co-founder of Y Combinator start-up accelerator, 
highlights the significance of revenue growth as a marker of success (Graham 2012). “If 
there's one number every founder should always know, it's the company's growth rate. 
That's the measure of a start-up. The best thing to measure the growth rate of is revenue.” 
As Ajujaht looks to produce high-growth start-ups, it is necessary to define a threshold 
of high growth. OECD defines high-growth companies as enterprises with average 
annualized growth greater than 20% per annum, over a three-year period (Eurostat-OECD 
2007). Annual growth exceeding 20% has also previously defined rapid-growth firms 
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(Fischer et al. 1997). For evaluation, compound annual growth rate for the last three years 
was calculated, if possible, for all applicable teams using geometric means. 
The eventual outcome for these teams is defined as their current status of either being 
successful or unsuccessful/failed. Appendix 2 compiles success evaluations for all TOP3 
contestants from 2008 to 2014. Based on these criteria, 5 out of 21 ideas are deemed 
successful. 
The core of this paper is a sequential explanatory research implemented by using a 
combined approach of survey and interviews. The key for initial data collection was 
simplicity for participants, since there was no real motivation for them to participate. 
Since data from media and public records is insufficient to make any conclusions on the 
possible causes of success and failure, it was essential to contact with the participants to 
obtain the necessary data and knowledge. The data was collected by using a combination 
of survey and a follow-up semi-structured interview, both conducted in Estonian. The 
data was then processed and content overlaps were searched. The survey was intended to 
address the possible factors already highlighted by previous studies on failure factors. 
The methodology for the survey analysis of start-up success/failure is partly based on the 
SHELL approach of Cantamessa et al (2018); the survey statements are divided into 
corresponding SHELL categories to highlight the results better.  
The survey methodology for the analysis of start-up success/failure is partly based on the 
approach of Cantamessa et al (2018), where they used an adaption of the SHELL model, 
a conceptual tool used for examining the interaction of system elements. It was originally 
implemented to classify aviation incidents, and adapted to fit the entrepreneurship sector 
by Ibid (2018). The SHELL name is formed by Software, Hardware, Environment, 
Liveware Individual and Liveware Group, and was first developed by Elwyn Edwards in 
1972 and later modified by Frank Hawkins in 1984 to illustrate the interactions between 
the person (central Liveware) and other four systems (Hawkins and Orlady 1993). 
Reinhart (1996) has defined SHELL model as the relationship between human factors 
and aviation environment. The framework focuses on identifying human factors and the 
relationships between human interfaces and other resources in the aviation system, 
highlighting how these aspects affect the realization of incidents. The model suggests that 
a human is rarely the sole cause of an incident. The simplicity and ability to bring out the 
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effects of human factors make the SHELL approach is appreciated by researchers. 
(Cantamessa et al 2018)		
Cantamessa et al (2018) conducted an analysis on a database of failure reports, identifying 
a high number of failure categories, which were subsequently clustered. The SHELL 
categories were used to better highlight the survey results. The author has added a number 
of factors from other studies, corresponding with the following SHELL macro-categories 
(Cantamessa et al 2018):  
• Software — the non-physical and impalpable part of the start-up and principally 
consists of the business model. Here, the term software includes all aspects of 
making the product/service commercially successful.  
• Hardware — the physical element of start-ups, mainly represented by the qualities 
of the product. 
• Environment — the physical context of start-ups’ operation. It involves the 
internal environment: the impact of competitors, and the external: stakeholders’ 
operations, and the economic, legal and political situation around the start-up.  
• Liveware — the human side of the start-up (customers, management, and 
workers). This component considers human performance, organization, 
capabilities, and limitations. It is divided into two parts: one refers to the external 
part, the customers’ side (L1), and the other to the internal part, people and the 
organization within the start-up (L2). 	
Factors and macro-categories are listed in Appendix 6. The 7-point Likert scale survey, 
of 5 sections and 33 questions, was intended to highlight the possible factors and was 
conducted in April-May 2020. The timeframe for statements was the first 4 years of 
business. Appendix 3 lists survey statements in their presented order. The statements were 
with both negative and positive connotations to avoid perceivable bias. Whereas Likert 
scales often have labels for each data point, this survey identified only extremal values (1 
as “disagree completely” and 7 as “agree completely”), the rest were left as numeric 
values. These were later divided as having positive, neutral or negative influence. The 
analysis of the survey will be limited to graphical and descriptive analysis as more 
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complex statistical methods (i.e. factor analysis) would require significantly bigger 
number of data entries, which would be feasible only if all contestants of Ajujaht 
throughout the years were surveyed. 
The interviews mainly addressed the observations highlighted in literature review, in 
addition providing background information. Semi-structured interviews of ~50 minutes 
were conducted in May-June 2020 with only those participants who had already finished 
the survey. The planned questions served often as an introduction to the topic; answers 
were often wider than the scope of the question. The interview questionnaire and its basis 
are listed in Appendix 4. The answers of interviewees were put through the process of 
inductive coding. The author followed the coding procedure described by Creswell 
(2002), illustrated in Figure 3. The transcripts were read several times to identify themes 
and categories. A coding frame was developed, after which the transcripts were reread 
and checked to meet to the new structure. 
Initial read 
through text 
data  
Identify specific 
segments of 
information  
Label the segments 
of information to 
create categories  
Reduce overlap 
and redundancy 
among the 
categories  
Create a model 
incorporating most 
important 
categories  
Many pages of 
text  
Many segments of 
text  30-40 categories  15-20 categories  3-8 categories  
 
Figure 3. Coding process in inductive analysis  
Source: (Creswell 2002), compiled by the author 
The approach implemented in this paper differs from Creswell’s (2002) in the final step; 
a model has not been created here as firstly, it is not the aim of this paper and second, it 
may lead to overly simplified conclusions. It would have been possible to somewhat 
reduce the number of categories but it would have had marginal benefits. The themes, 
along with eventual categories are listed in Appendix 5. 
A total of 21 projects qualified to be included in this paper. Of 21 a total of 10 teams 
(47.6%) provided data for this paper. Two other teams provided a laconic explanation of 
their project’s upshot, but not enough to be considered as participants of this study. All 
10 took part of the survey; seven of the 10 also agreed to partake in a 50-minute semi-
structured interview. The responded companies and individuals are listed in Table 2. Four 
out of ten teams that took the survey did not answer all questions; as they never made it 
to the market, they skipped the sales and customer analysis section. Unfortunately, based 
 
 
23 
 
on the total number of respondents, the representativeness has room for improvement for 
future studies. 
 
Table 2. Responded companies and individuals 
  
Idea/company Representative Completed the survey Gave an interview 
CellTells/Flipper Mikk-Alvar Olle Yes No 
Flow Ülari Kalamees Yes Yes 
Growfish Martin Liiv Yes Yes 
ReUse Republic Mari Martin Yes No 
Vetmed Hannes Küün Yes Yes 
Click & Grow Martin Laidla Yes Yes 
Virtual Garden Annika & Martin Goroško Yes No 
Like a Local Guide Ülane Vilumets Yes Yes 
Jomi Interactive Andre Eistre Yes Yes 
Timbeter Anna-Greta Tsahkna Yes Yes 
 
Source: Compiled by the author 
By mixing the methods of survey and interviews, the intention is to gain in breadth and 
depth of understanding and corroboration, while remediating the weaknesses that are 
inherent to solely one or the other method. Nevertheless, there are some homothetic and 
idiographic limitations for the paper in hand.  
A methodical concern of this paper is the selection of success/failure criteria, as this is a 
possible occurrence of selection bias. This is, in itself, due to the multitude of 
interpretations of business success. Other criteria would not necessarily produce the same 
results. Also, it is impossible to indefinitely say whether a company is successful or not; 
one can only assess it up to a given moment. This classification could change in the future. 
Using data obtained from the subjects themselves could lead to a skewed reflection on 
the matter. There is a possibility for social desirability bias for both Likert and interview 
questions, although questions that might insinuate to an evaluation of respondent’s social 
or moral conduct were avoided. As an additional precaution, interviewees only received 
a brief overview of the study at the outset to avoid priming respondents to answer in 
particular socially acceptable ways (Steenkamp, De Jong and Baumgartner 2010). 
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Validity of the gathered information is contingent on respondents’ honesty. Interviewees 
were briefed that there were no right or wrong answers; the author encouraged them to 
use examples and evidence to support their opinions. 
Likert answers could be influenced by previous questions, be heavily concentrated on one 
response side (agree/disagree) or in the middle. Also, relying on participant’s memories 
means that some respondents may have already forgotten key details, as the scope of the 
paper reaches up to 12 years back. To mitigate it, respondents received the questions 
beforehand to have time to recall facts and events.  
2.2. Research subjects 
The pool of subjects of this research are the top 3 business ideas from Ajujaht 
competitions of 2008 to 2014 (seasons 1-7), a total of 21 business ideas. Nearly all teams 
formed a company to proceed with the implementation of their business ideas; the 
outcome evaluation is largely based on the performance of corresponding companies. All 
numbers and descriptions of revenues, profits and losses are based on the data and annual 
business reports from the Estonian Business Register, except if referred otherwise, and 
are listed in Appendix 1. The descriptions of teams that did not part-take in this research 
are listed in Appendix 7. 
The first season of Ajujaht ended in 2008 with the win of CellTells, a duo proposing to 
create a voice-activated interface for inserting new entries in mobile device calendars. 
This team developed a prototype but did not manage to find any additional investors. By 
next spring, this idea had evolved into a location-based advertising service Flipper that 
relied on co-operation with cell service providers. Except for the first two years, both the 
CellTells and Flipper businesses were at a loss up until 2018, when the businesses were 
shut. The runner-up for that season was team Flow, with a solution for optimising usage 
of storage spaces in warehouses by using the free space in the corridors located between 
rows of shelves. As the funding for this project was pulled right at the beginning of 2008 
economic crisis, it never started to work as a business.  
The winner of the 2009 season was team Growfish, which had the idea of making a 
wireless system for fish farms that allows more comfortable management and oversight. 
The team did try to proceed with the idea business-wise, but they never managed to get 
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their business running. According to Aasmäe (2014), the bad start of their company was 
due to a poor summer season for fish farms, which in turn meant that it was really difficult 
to find a client for their prototype. The team has no intentions pursuing the idea in the 
near future. Second place was claimed by ReUse Repulic. The idea was to produce clothes 
from the leftover garments and damaged products from the clothing industry by 
redesigning these into unique products, therefore reducing the overproducing of fabrics. 
ReUse Republic held a limited but stabile revenue for the first five years of operation but 
has not succeeded to do so afterwards. Throughout the years, it has had sporadic profits 
and losses. The founder of ReUse Republic now operates other clothing brands.  
2010 was the first season to have a big breakthrough. The winning team Click & Grow 
came up with the idea of a smart herbal indoor garden device that would allow people to 
grow different plants indoors with minimal effort. Their device regulates watering and 
light exposure to the exact amount the plants need. Click & Grow’s revenue has grown 
significantly every year and reached nearly 6.5 million EUR in 2018. Click & Grow tried 
to expand to new markets quickly and, due to significant costs of entering to new markets, 
has reached profit only in 2017. They currently operate in Europe, Asia and the US. 
Runner-up of 2010 was team VetMed, who developed new testing equipment for testing 
animals for infectious and genetical diseases. They started with their business idea at the 
time; the award money was used as a seed fund for investments, but team members soon 
after pursued other activities.  
The winning team of 2011 season was VirtualGarden. They developed a platform where 
customers could be farmers without actually owning a plot of land themselves. The 
customers of VirtualGarden were supposed to select a plant that VirtualGarden would 
then plant and grow. During harvesting season, they would harvest the crops and deliver 
it to their clients. The team tried to get it running for two years but stopped eventually.  
Third-place winner in 2012 was team Like a Local Guide, a platform for tourists to find 
travel info and recommendations from local experts. The service was and is free for 
tourists; the source of income is publishing commission from travel and tour operators. 
The platform is operating internationally. It is a company with a growing revenue, but is 
yet to be profitable. The original founders sold most of their shares in the company in 
2020. 
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 The runner-up of 2013 was Jomi Interactive, a smart device designed to monitor daily 
water consumption. The team developed their product within the first year of their 
operation but turned to other activities afterwards. The company was shut in 2016. Season 
7 in 2014 has been the most successful season of Ajujaht so far. The winner was team 
Timber Diameter, now Timbeter, which developed an app to precisely measure the 
volume of timber by photographing the logs. After an extensive development process, the 
company has now over 20000 users in 61 different countries. Their revenue is growing 
rapidly but they are yet to reach to a profit. 
As a number of participants did not respond to or denied participation offers, the number 
of participants with complete input was 7, three only finished the Likert survey and two 
declined from both the survey and interview, but offered a brief insight to their 
corresponding projects. Although the jury highlighted some factors during the 
competition that may have influenced the future progress of those teams, their decisions 
were on occasions based on gut feeling and experience. The following chapter looks more 
closely onto the possible factors of failure and success for the participants of this study. 
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3. RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
3.1. Results of the survey 
The results of the survey are divided into five SHELL categories based on Cantamessa et 
al (2018), with the results of each category split based on the success of projects. Figure 
4 shows survey replies in SHELL category Software for unsuccessful projects. As four 
teams responded partially to questions in this category, these are presented by markers. 
 
 
Figure 4. Survey replies in SHELL category: Software, unsuccessful projects (values 1 
as “disagree completely” and 7 as “agree completely”). 
Source: compiled by the author 
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This survey identified only extremal values (1 as “disagree completely” and 7 as “agree 
completely”). Figure 5 shows survey replies in SHELL category Software for successful 
projects. Based on figures 4 and 5, evaluations show that unsuccessful teams did not rank 
their business models very highly, whereas successful teams agreed that their business 
model was good. Unsuccessful teams were quite positive about the demand for their 
service/product, albeit less than successful companies. The evaluation for marketing 
effectiveness is mostly similar for both outcomes; but Like a Local Guide was somewhat 
negative. Unsuccessful companies claim to have had even better traction than successful 
teams, as Timbeter was neutral. The timing for product launch was evaluated quite poorly 
by CellTells, other teams from both sides evaluated this similarly. Majority of 
unsuccessful teams changed their vision of the project, successful teams have changed it 
less. All companies, except ReUse Republic, were positive about the conclusions based 
on customer feedback. Except for CellTells, unsuccessful projects had some pricing/cost 
issues, as did Click & Grow. Their low rating was discussed during interview; their initial 
product was too complicated and expensive to make. They later rectified that issue. 
  
 
Figure 5. Survey replies in SHELL category: Software, successful projects. 
Source: compiled by the author 
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Figures 6 and 7 show that successful companies rated their emphasis on product 
development a little higher, but teams from both sides were definitely positive about it.  
 
 
Figure 6. Survey replies in SHELL category: Hardware, unsuccessful projects. 
Source: compiled by the author 
Unsuccessful teams were less in agreement about gathering relevant feedback from 
customers; answers were spread almost throughout the scale. Similar sight was with 
successful companies; Like A Local was negative about their conduct. Product’s 
feasibility/sustainability was rated high by all successful and unsuccessful teams, except 
for Click&Grow and ReUse Republic. As ReUse Republic was manufacturing unique 
products by hand, it is comprehensible. 
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
H
 S
er
io
us
 e
m
ph
as
is
w
as
 p
ut
 o
n 
pr
od
uc
t
de
ve
lo
pm
en
t d
ur
in
g
th
e 
ea
rly
 p
ha
se
 o
f t
he
pr
oj
ec
t.
H
 S
uf
fic
ie
nt
 a
nd
re
le
va
nt
 fe
ed
ba
ck
w
as
 g
at
he
re
d 
fro
m
(p
ot
en
tia
l)
cu
st
om
er
s.
H
 T
he
pr
od
uc
t/s
er
vi
ce
 w
as
te
ch
ni
ca
lly
fe
as
ib
le
/s
us
ta
in
ab
le
.
H
 T
he
 q
ua
lit
y 
of
 th
e
so
ld
 p
ro
du
ct
/se
rv
ic
e
w
as
 g
oo
d.
Survey replies in SHELL category: Hardware, unsuccessful 
projects
Virtual Garden CellTells/Flipper
Flow GrowFish
Jomi VetMed
ReUse Republic
 
 
30 
 
 
 
Figure 7. Survey replies in SHELL category: Hardware, unsuccessful projects. 
Source: compiled by the author 
Click & Grow explained their low rating during interview; it was given because their first 
products were indeed too complicated. Unsuccessful companies that managed to sell their 
service/product were less optimistic about its quality; only ReUse Republic rated the 
quality positively. All successful companies rated the quality of their product/service very 
highly. 
Figures 8 and 9 indicate that the strength of competitors varied for both outcomes. 
Click&Grow and Timbeter rated both the amount and the strength of competitors low. 
Like A Local rated both high.  
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Figure 8. Survey replies in SHELL category: Environment, unsuccessful projects. 
Source: compiled by the author 
Pulling investors and external funding and the sufficiency of investments had a varying 
degree of success for unsuccessful companies. Flow has ranked the sufficiency of their 
hypothetical investment that they did not receive. Succesful companies ranked attracting 
investments neutral-slightly difficult and the sufficiency of investments as neutral-
slightly low. 
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Figure 9. Survey replies in SHELL category: Environment, successful projects. 
Source: compiled by the author 
Successful and unsuccessful teams claim that they used Ajujaht for contacts and 
networking fairly well. Political/legal/economic problems were of mixed importance for 
unsuccessful businesses. They were of low importance for successful businesses, except 
for Timbeter, whose method had to be certified in Germany and had to apply for changing 
legislation in Lithuania, as the existing legislation at the time did not approve their method 
of measuring timber. The geographical expansion was very successful for all successful 
companies and very unsuccessful for unsuccessful companies. Presumably, this is 
because unsuccessful companies never got to the point of expanding abroad, which makes 
it more of a result and less a factor.  
Figures 10 shows that this part was unanswered by teams that did not launch a product 
on the market. It illustrates that customer aquisition costs mostly paid off for CellTells 
and VirtualGarden, but not for ReUse. Customer loyalty was rated higher by all 
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unsuccessful teams. Virtual Garden had sufficient clientele, CellTells and ReUse were 
not as optimistic in their evaluation. 
 
 
Figure 10. Survey replies in SHELL category: Liveware (Customer), unsuccessful 
projects. 
Source: compiled by the author 
Figure 11 shows that customer aquisition costs paid off for all successful companies. 
Customer loyalty was an issue of mixed importance. They were slightly positive about 
clientele sufficiency. 
 
 
Figure 11. Survey replies in SHELL category: Liveware (Customer), successful 
projects. 
Source: compiled by the author 
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As Liveware L2 is the category with most factors; figures are split into two parts. Figure 
12 shows over half of the unsuccessful teams agreeing that they had insufficient focus on 
business development. There were mixed results on businesses running out of money. 
The project’s scalability returned a split result, half of them were positive about it and 
half were not.  
 
 
Figure 12. Survey replies in SHELL category: Liveware (Organization), unsuccessful 
projects, part 1. 
Source: compiled by the author 
The statement to address the issue of motivation was, in hindsight, poorly worded, as it 
describes the level of current motivation. It is ranked very low by most unsuccessful 
teams. Jomi and CellTells agreed that the process resulted in a mental burnout, the rest 
did better. Figure 13 shows L2 results for successful teams. None of them agreed they 
lacked business development, but Like A Local claimed to have run out of money. All 
successful businesses rated their scalability highly. Like A Local was led to a mental 
burnout, and as the founders sold their business recently, it is clear why their motivation 
to continue is low. Other teams were more motivated and did not identify a burnout.  
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Figure 13. Survey replies in SHELL category: Liveware (Organization), successful 
projects. 
Source: compiled by the author 
Figures 13 and 14 illustrate the second half of L2 Liveware category. More than half of 
the unsuccessful companies ran into organizational issues. Organizational issues gave a 
mixed result for successful companies, as did the team assembly for unsuccesful teams. 
Successful teams were assembled sub-optimally. Both succssful and unsuccessful teams 
had rated the level of team disharmony as low. More than half of unsuccessful projects 
had some issues that, to a degree, required a pivot. Of the successful teams, Like A Local 
identified a need for pivot, but the pivots were not successful for them. The pivots were 
also not successful for over half of the unsuccessful companies. For the rest of the 
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successful companies, the need for pivot was low and the rearrangements they made were 
successful. 
 
 
Figure 14. Survey replies in SHELL category: Liveware (Organization), unsuccessful 
projects, part 2. 
Source: compiled by the author 
According to Figure 15, unsuccessful companies answered most negatively in category 
Liveware (organization), 46% of the given answers given had a negative connotation, 
followed by Environment (33%) and Software (28%). Successful companies were most 
negative in the customer part of Liveware, L1 (33%), followed by Environment (24%) 
and Liveware L2. 
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Figure 15. SHELL classification of survey responses. 
Source: compiled by the author 
Unsuccessful companies answered most positively in category Hardware (63%), as did 
successful companies (83%). Software (also 83%) and Liveware L2 (60%) were the 
second and third most positively answered categories for successful companies. 
Hardware was followed by Environment (58%) and Liveware L1 (56%) for unsuccessful 
companies.  
3.2. Results of the interviews 
Of the seven interviewed teams, three fall in the category of successful companies, four 
do not. These four are also the companies that never managed to bring their product to 
the market. Also, all unsuccessful teams developed products, two out of three successful 
projects developed services. The interviews helped to generate multiple categories of 
data, some of which include factors of failure and/or success. Themes and categories are 
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listed in Appendix 5. Firstly, the results of the interviews show previous experience in 
business/entrepreneurship as a factor of success. Teams that were straight out of 
universities did not do that well. As put by Martin Liiv from GrowFish (Liiv 2020):  
“35-year-olds should participate in Ajujaht. Confidence only is not enough, to make 
something great happen, you need to have experience”. 
Diverse previous experience was a connecting link for all three successful teams. Martin 
Laidla from Click&Grow emphasized the background of the founder, Mattias Lepp 
(Laidla 2020):  
“The conductor’s education has been useful in conducting people and managing different 
activities.” 
The failed teams admitted that they lacked experience and highlighted this in regards to 
decision-making, planning, partner selection. Also, Ajujaht was the first business plan 
competition for nearly all interviewed projects, therefore previous competitive experience 
was not a factor of disparity. Successful companies had looked for external support before 
the competition, either for financing or advice. Before entering a contest that was 
organized by Enterprise Estonia, Like A Local applied directly for start-up capital, but 
without any luck (Vilumets 2020): 
“Enterprise Estonia’s money-sharing mechanism was unable to fit our project to a 
certain box.” 
No motivational disparity was noted. There is an age-related variance; the average age of 
successful founders was 31 whereas unsuccessful projects were in average founded at the 
age of 25. Also, all interviewed teams that were considered successful had at least one 
female member, but a female member in itself is not a guarantee for success.  
A discrepancy is related to funding: three out of four unsuccessful companies did not 
want to bring in external investors, at least in earlier stages, despite raising interest. It was 
more about keeping shares and keeping the company small-scale. Also, all successful 
companies needed a considerable amount of funds (≥100000€) to get their business 
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running, all of them were initially backed by Estonian investors; foreign backing came in 
later rounds.  
Nearly all interviewees had issues during product development that arised either due to 
external software/hardware developers, partners or tech employees. It must be chosen 
carefully who is chosen to work with:  
“It came out afterwards that the same developer was working on its own on a similar 
platform for other things and we essentially paid for their development.” (Liiv 2020) 
And also, free was a relative term: 
“They warned us about involving Arts Academy students, but we were blinded…we’re 
getting them for free. Well, we got their help for free, but as a result, we spent a lot more 
money than we should have had.” (Eistre 2020) 
Teams mostly remained true to their original business plan as Ajujaht system had helped 
to make it well-sorted. Like a Local Guide went a long way with their business plan, as 
they developed their first just for the sake of Ajujaht jury, only to come back to the 
original couple years later. Hannes Küün from VetMed about their business plan (Küün 
2020):  
“We got quite a bit of support from Ajujaht in putting it together, they gave us an actual 
input.” 
Another note is related to customer base; successful projects have had more fundamental 
customer-related issues, such as this:  
“We have to create the market, we have to educate people. The fact that you buy a salad 
that has been grown 1500km from here…the supply chain is so big, half of it goes to 
waste, half of the resource expenditure for growing that salad is pointless, a big waste. 
You need to educate and prep people on all of this.” (Laidla 2020) 
Conversely, successful companies have had the opportunity of managing their clientele, 
giving more time for issues to arise. There was a mixed level of confidence in conducting 
business for both successful and failed teams. 
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Interestingly, only Like A Local Guide highlighted the role of competition in their 
operations. Since they operated in the tourism and travel sector, they had to compete with 
the likes of Booking.com and Conde Nast Traveller, behemoths of travel industry. Flow 
and Jomi Interactive mentioned that during their development process, competitors from 
abroad were starting to develop similar products. Click & Grow highlighted the simplicity 
of their product, which differentiates them from their competition and results in less 
reliability issues. 
External factors seemed to be somewhat of a factor for failure; half of the unsuccessful 
teams were affected by it. Growfish founders were influenced by the heatwave of 2010 
when in their family fish farm, a million euros worth of fish died, which changed their 
priorities completely. Flow was undone by the global recession; a potential investor 
pulled the offer at the last minute and no one was willing to invest at that time. 
Unsuccessful teams seem to have used up valuable time during product development 
process, mainly due to problems with product design and engineering. Successful teams 
noted that getting somewhere, either due to product or customer development, took a lot 
more time than expected.  
The outcome of the company is largely affected by how much time is spent on developing 
the business and whether are any sideline projects to refrain on completely dedicating to 
the project. People behind successful projects dedicated themselves to their businesses, 
whereas other teams juggled between work, other projects and school. Andre Eistre from 
Jomi Interactive had a lot on his plate (Eistre 2020): 
”It was an intense and a really cool period in my life… I worked full-time, went to 
unversity, did this Jomi thing, and I think I sometimes engaged in a hobby as well… and 
then I started creating IT software, so I had another start-up as well. It was probably not 
the most reasonable decision, perhaps I should have put more attention to Jomi to get 
that running.” 
Expectations did not play a role in the eventual outcome. Interviewees could all identify 
a milestone where they had an idea of the eventual outcome; albeit different in nature, a 
common ground was that it took a lot of time to get there. The perceived role of Ajujaht 
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was quite similar for all interviewed teams; it offered some exposure but mainly contacts 
and advice. Unanimously, Ajujaht was seen as a positive platform for making a start-up 
and making themselves visible. Nearly all teams had received advice after the 
competition. The way how contacts and advice was exploited was different in each case. 
Unsuccessful companies reflected on their progress and what was missing over the course 
of building a company. In hindsight, all unsuccessful interviewees felt that they were 
missing out on specific advice, whether it was from an engineering perspective or for 
understanding the customer. As highlighted by Ülari Kalamees from Flow (Kalamees 
2020): 
“It would have helped us a lot if someone had shaken us early on and told us that guys, 
you won’t make it on your own, you need an engineer and secondly someone who can 
navigate in this world of warehousing.” 
Also, insufficient experience and need for outside expertise stood out here again, as all 
unsuccessful companies highlighted their “greenness”. The fact that they had little 
knowledge about what to make of the advice they were given reflects on this. The 
interviews revealed varied opinions about the key factors of their eventual outcomes. 
3.3. Discussion and conclusion 
The progression that each subject had since the completion of Ajujaht varied 
significantly. This means that the starting points for answering the survey and research 
questions were contrasting. Nevertheless, even with a small number of subjects some 
factors of success and insuccess stood out. 
Evaluations showed that unsuccessful teams had issues with their business models, 
whereas successful teams rated their business models high. During interviews, As more 
than half of the unsuccessful teams changed their vision of the project, it may be tied to 
the need of adjusting business models. The same applies to pricing issues, the reasons 
probably lie within the business plan. Over half of the unsuccessful teams had insufficient 
focus on business development and almost all unsuccessful companies agreed that the 
early focus was more on product development. It is evident that there is a possible 
connection. The reason for this came up in some of the interviews; the pressure to have a 
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minimum viable product/service is considerable, as the potential outcome of going to 
investors with a product was seen better than when going without. Some also noticed that 
it worked like this 10 years ago when they were in Ajujaht, but it has since changed and 
ideas are valued more. It seems that the need to present a viable product to the investors 
is not that obtrusive anymore. Over half of the unsuccessful companies had organizational 
issues. With small teams, there was often the issue of dividing tasks and making time to 
complete these tasks. Also, more than half of unsuccessful projects had some issues that, 
to a degree, required a pivot. This makes sense; successful companies did not have such 
need to reorganize, their activity was moving them forward. Unsuccessful companies 
needed a change to get them going again. Their need for a pivot often derived from 
previous poor decisions. Unfortunately, the pivots were mostly unsuccessful. The results 
of the survey partially reflect the results from Cantamessa et al (2018). Their results also 
highlighted problems with business model and poor business development.  
The findings on start-up capital size and source provided contradictory results with Van 
Gelderen et al (2005). Those intending to use more start-up capital had, in general, better 
success. This could be connected to findings of Duchesneau and Gartner (1990); in this 
case big ambitions that required more resources brought success.  
The interviews showed age and experience as definite factors that affect the outcome of 
the project. The age difference of 25 vs 31 for failed vs successful founders is in line with 
McKenzie and Sansone’s (2019) findings on non-winners of BPCs. As non-winners were 
out of the scope of this research, this finding is not directly comparable with theirs, nor 
with Azoulay et al’s (2018). Here, there were no participants who were >40 at the time 
of founding. However, this result reflects largely the one of Prasad et al (2015). The 
author initially failed to acknowledge small differences in age as a possible factor in pre-
interview phase. In authors opinion, the result on age, combined with the findings on 
experience, prove that the initial real-world experience gained from mid-twenties to 
thirties is vital, as it helps to better understand the mechanism of making and running a 
start-up. Oddly, VC is biased towards youth. According to Paul Graham of Y Combinator, 
the average age of team members from which investors are sceptical about investing in a 
team is 32 (Rich 2013). The result here indicates that the VC cut-off point is actually a 
sweet-spot for founders’ age. There is another point to make here; teams that were 
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from universities did not succeed afterwards. Though all interviewed teams and their 
members were graduates, not all were successful. That said, the literature (e.g. 
Wijewardena and Cooray 1996; Indarti and Langenberg 2004) does not address the 
interaction of success, education and founders age together. This is a topic that future 
studies could investigate.  
The unison position on the role of Ajujaht confirms Van Gelderen et al’s (2005); that 
those with limited entrepreneurial experience benefit from information and guidance. As 
more than 300 teams take part in Ajujaht every year, it suggests that by participating in 
Ajujaht, nascent entrepreneurs inadvertently match the suggestions on reducing 
knowledge gaps on both education and outside expertise. 
Albeit studies on previous entrepreneurship and industrial experience have had varying 
results, this paper showed clearly that success depended on previous experience. Whether 
the difference in outcome comes from industrial or entrepreneurial experience, is unclear, 
though the author suggests it is more likely entrepreneurial experience. The significant 
importance of previous experience upholds the findings of Raman (2004), Corbett (2007) 
and Wijewardena and Cooray (1996). Also, results correspond to Agnieszka and 
Mackiewicz’s (2020) claim that diverse educational/professional backgrounds raise 
chances of entrepreneurial success. The results completely contradict Gottschalk et al 
(2014); experience did matter and once a failed entrepreneur was later successful (based 
on single case). As their results are not confirmed by this or other studies, the author 
surmises that there are factors inherent to German entrepreneurial environment which led 
to their result. Also, teams that lacked experience also identified it as a missing 
component of their effort and felt that they were missing out on specific advice, whether 
it was from an engineering perspective or for understanding the customer. Perhaps 
providing this advice is a topic to focus on for the organizers of Ajujaht.  
Nearly all interviewees had issues during product development that arose either due to 
external software/hardware developers, partners or tech employees. Although failed 
teams did as suggested by Tipu and Arain (2011), Chrisman and McMullan (2004) and 
Duchesneau and Gartner (1990), sought assistance for problems that were out of their 
competence, the end results reflect the observation of Davidsson (2002b), where 
competence and help of outside experts were not up to par. These issues also used up 
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valuable time during product development process. It is important to understand the 
competence of external partners before making the choice to collaborate.  
This paper and Van Gelderen et al (2005) show that decision to switch from part-time to 
full-time is an indication that the entrepreneur can start the business. Teams admitted that 
other responsibilities and inherent lack of focus affected their progress negatively. All 
successful companies had almost completely dedicated founders that decided to put other 
projects aside and work full-time (or more) to benefit to the success of their project. This 
makes the results in line with Duchesneau and Gartner (1990). Members of unsuccessful 
teams often had a day job to attend to, and other projects in addition. As Ajujaht was 
originally a competition that was aimed at university students, school was also a factor. 
Some members of these teams had to manage even all three at once. A common trait for 
interviewees was that all were obtaining or had obtained a higher degree by the time they 
had finished Ajujaht, implying that having a degree is not a predictor of success. The 
following list is a summary of the most important factors that successful teams had in 
common: 
• well-developed business plan, focus on business development, 
• sufficient dedication, 
• age (members were older than in unsuccessful teams), 
• experience, 
• proactively looking for investors. 
The following list is a summary of the most important factors that unsuccessful teams had 
in common: 
• issues with business plan and business development, 
• lack of dedication, 
• youth, 
• lack of experience, 
• problems with outside expertise, 
• time management, 
• technical issues in development. 
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Many of these factors can affect any starting company, whether it has competed in a BPC 
or not, but Ajujaht has its role. Ajujaht helps to shape the key aspects of business plans; 
these plans were validated and adjusted by multiple specialists. During the post-Ajujaht 
development of their business ideas, teams did not substantially change their business 
plans, meaning they relied on the plan that, in hindsight, was not the best. Still, teams 
themselves are responsible for creating, fulfilling and adjusting the business plan. The 
results coincide with Wadhwa (2009), but partially. As he suggests that business 
competition winners may be influenced by praise that comes too early and too easily; it 
is less about early praise here and more about failed businesses having abstained from 
putting in the effort to make the business work in the long term. Contrary to Wadhwa’s 
(2009) assumption, teams had gathered an understanding of market needs and validated 
their ideas.  
Previous conclusions have to be taken with certain reservations. Firstly, 10 of 21 qualified 
projects were closely examined, leaving gaps data entirety. The selection of included 
variables in this paper is ad hoc and since it may reflect author’s opinion, it may also 
exclude crucial factors of future success. As this paper does not have grounds for 
statistical analysis, the interpretation process leaves a considerable chance for author’s 
bias. There is no definitive qualitative methodology to correctly and confidently process 
and combine the data in such small number of cases. Although the author avoided 
ambiguous questions, it cannot be ruled out that some questions had varying 
interpretations by different respondents. As the events that this paper is based on 
happened up to 12 years before, it is highly likely that some of the important information 
has already been forgotten. On the other hand, it is essential to gather information now to 
avoid the further loss of infomation and memories over time. 
Finding a more efficient way to engage Ajujaht teams in research is an aspect to focus on 
more thoroughly. It is important to note that these previously highlighted factors may 
influence start-ups, nascent entrepreneurs and established companies separately from the 
fact whether these start-ups or (once) nascent entrepreneurs took part of a business plan 
competition or not. 
Nevertheless, it is the authors belief that in the small business field of Estonia, these 
results offer some food for thought. Follow-up studies on BPCs are not as frequent as the 
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competitions themselves. This paper is the first to focus on the participants of Ajujaht, 
and their progress after the competition. Still, what can be done with the results? As this 
competition is called to life and co-organized by Enterprise Estonia, this paper offers 
some suggestions on competition design, and in broader sense, how to better operate with 
public resources. Namely, in addition to a mentor programme, Ajujaht should involve 
specialists of corresponding fields of competing teams to meet and discuss the specific 
needs and questions teams might have. Although Ajujaht does occasionally bring 
specialists on board, it is more for the purpose of evaluation and general advice on 
specialist’s respected field. Considering that the jury has given suggestions, that in 
hindsight, were deemed questionable by the participants, it would add to the advice of the 
jury. Understandably, this would be nearly impossible to provide in earlier stages of the 
competition due to high costs and the number of competitors, but in later stages teams 
would benefit from it. 
Secondly, it also provides business angels and venture capitalists something to think 
about, Even though the regular conduct for VC is to prefer younger founders because of 
their more up-to-date and disruptive ideas, it also conflicts with their common practice of 
valuing the team and its skills. Skills, experience and knowledge come with age; finding 
a problem worth solving and investing also takes time. It is exactly what Azoulay et al 
(2018) highlighted in their study. 
Last, but not least, this paper offers new start-up founders some perspective on the hazards 
of entrepreneurial journey. It is always easier to learn from the experiences and mistakes 
of others. Despite that these results cannot be excessively extended to other countries, 
competitions and companies, this paper casts some light to a little-studied field of what 
comes after business plan competitions. There is still a lot to explore on this topic and on 
business plan competitions in general. This field provides multiple options for further 
research, for example, following studies have the opportunity to compose a 
success/failure model for Estonian companies or increase the subject pool in the context 
of Ajujaht and see if there are statistically valid conclusions to be made. Since there is 
little literature that compares the views of different parties on how their skills and 
experience affects the evaluation of business opportunities, one could take a closer look 
at Estonian start-ups through an investors’ perspective, compare the success rates for 
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different start-up incubators, develop a strategy for mitigating the effects of improper 
business plan validation and so on. As the field of start-ups is continously active, there is 
no shortage on research topics. 
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APPENDICES 
Appendix 1. Key financial data of Ajujaht 2008-2014 TOP3 contestants  
 
 
Year
Revenue, 
EUR
Net profit, 
EUR
Net profit 
margin
Revenue 
growth
Revenue, 
EUR
Net profit, 
EUR
Net profit 
margin
Revenue 
growth
Revenue, 
EUR
Net profit, 
EUR
Net profit 
margin
Revenue 
growth
2008 - - - - - - - -
2009 18203 7362 40,4% - - - - - - - -
2010 3452 1447 41,9% -81% - - - - - - - -
2011 0 -24051 - -100% - - - - - - - -
2012 2403 -33597 -1398,1% - - - - - - - - -
2013 7031 -92504 -1315,7% 193% - - - - - - - -
2014 605 -13148 -2173,2% -91% - - - - - - - -
2015 520 -1609 -309,4% -14% - - - - - - - -
2016 0 -7771 - -100% - - - - - - - -
2017 0 0 - - - - - - - - - -
2018 0 117187 - - - - - - - - - -
Ajujaht 2008
CellTells/Flipper OÜ Flow OÜ Textmarker
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Year
Revenue, 
EUR
Net profit, 
EUR
Net profit 
margin
Revenue 
growth
Revenue, 
EUR
Net profit, 
EUR
Net profit 
margin
Revenue 
growth
Revenue, 
EUR
Net profit, 
EUR
Net profit 
margin
Revenue 
growth
2009 602 549 91,2%
2010 0 -1543 - 0 140 - -100%
2011 0 -2302 - - 10044 152 1,51% 9500 9366 98,6% -
2012 0 -241 - - 15933 372 2,33% 59% 15950 4721 29,6% 68%
2013 0 -323 - - 16491 -3762 -22,81% 4% 6925 -8496 -122,7% -57%
2014 350 -66 -19% - 15816 -3261 -20,62% -4% 5500 -5809 -105,6% -21%
2015 350 25 7% 0% 17883 5798 32,42% 13% 1400 -258 -18,4% -75%
2016 0 4674 - -100% 2279 1383 60,68% -87% 2600 920 35,4% 86%
2017 700 402 57% - 0 -55 - -100% 1000 -934 -93,4% -62%
2018 0 705 - - 0 42 - - 200 84 42,0% -80%
Year
Revenue, 
EUR
Net profit, 
EUR
Net profit 
margin
Revenue 
growth
Revenue, 
EUR
Net profit, 
EUR
Net profit 
margin
Revenue 
growth
Revenue, 
EUR
Net profit, 
EUR
Net profit 
margin
Revenue 
growth
2010 0 -55499 - 0 15963 - 1828 -295 -16%
2011 120009 -103051 -86% - 0 -9 - - 2872 588 20% 57%
2012 692968 -154624 -22% 477% 0 1596 - - 1407 -30 -2% -51%
2013 1360956 -121237 -9% 96% 0 -2739 - - 493 264 54% -65%
2014 1026158 -594937 -58% -25% 0 -839 - - 327 -285 -87% -34%
2015 1325593 -453826 -34% 29% 0 6706 - - 175 -274 -157% -46%
2016 2381959 -64354 -3% 80% 0 -406 - - 772 238 31% 341%
2017 4279695 180731 4% 80% 0 -1960 - - 11477 124 1% 1387%
2018 6493412 -609737 -9% 52% 18977 4936 26% 65%
Ajujaht 2009
Growfish/Primefish Solutions OÜ ReUse Republic OÜ Optimistid/Eurus Powerboats OÜ
Ajujaht 2010
Click & Grow OÜ Vetmed/SynoBio OÜ Õpime mängides/Ciconia Õppemängud OÜ
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Year
Revenue, 
EUR
Net profit, 
EUR
Net profit 
margin
Revenue 
growth
Revenue, 
EUR
Net profit, 
EUR
Net profit 
margin
Revenue 
growth
Revenue, 
EUR
Net profit, 
EUR
Net profit 
margin
Revenue 
growth
2010 37918 15030 39,6%
2011 0 -240 - 0 -9 - 53809 39816 74,0% 42%
2012 1066 -1321 -124% - 594 129 21,72% - 20733 1319 6,4% -61%
2013 0 -1440 - -100% 1023 -211 -20,63% 72% 30500 -10975 -36,0% 47%
2014 0 -1440 - - 660 372 56,36% -35% 13518 2886 21,3% -56%
2015 3660 2219 61% - 550 550 100,00% -17% 8782 -4475 -51,0% -35%
2016 1280 77 6% -65% - - - - 13482 -250 -1,9% 54%
2017 12359 9565 77% 866% - - - - 10966 -3588 -32,7% -19%
2018 7895 -252 -3% -36% - - - - 27825 -57404 -206,3% 154%
Year
Revenue, 
EUR
Net profit, 
EUR
Net profit 
margin
Revenue 
growth
Revenue, 
EUR
Net profit, 
EUR
Net profit 
margin
Revenue 
growth
Revenue, 
EUR
Net profit, 
EUR
Net profit 
margin
Revenue 
growth
2013 2619 -924 -35% -75% 87739 -3378 -3,85% 158% 5886 -25002 -424,8% 2551%
2014 3169 -314 -10% 21% 31020 6430 20,73% -65% 20641 -53744 -260,4% 251%
2015 3815 -2087 -55% 20% 336716 10632 3,16% 985% 33797 -104870 -310,3% 64%
2016 878 257 29% -77% 904375 93934 10,39% 169% 49728 -166375 -334,6% 47%
2017 500 -105 -21% -43% 708139 19009 2,68% -22% 94421 -81915 -86,8% 90%
2018 334 168 50% -33% 1035038 45504 4,40% 46% 155063 -23945 -15,4% 64%
Virtual Garden OÜ Plaisir du Chat OÜ KPA Scientific OÜ
Ajujaht 2011
Ajujaht 2012
Raybike OÜ GrillCube/Grillseason OÜ Like A Local Guide/Local Guide OÜ
3396123%24732012 16069 47,32% 222 -6099 -2747,3%10538
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Source: Estonian Business Register, compiled by the author 
Year
Revenue, 
EUR
Net profit, 
EUR
Net profit 
margin
Revenue 
growth
Revenue, 
EUR Net profit, EUR
Net profit 
margin
Revenue 
growth
Revenue, 
EUR
Net profit, 
EUR
Net profit 
margin
Revenue 
growth
2013 0 17454 - 5273 -2210 -41,91% 500 11459 2291,8%
2014 0 583 - - 8852 1316 14,87% 68% 0 -215 - -100%
2015 0 98 - - 125 -5312 -4249,60% -99% 0 -972 - -
2016 0 1524 - - - - - - 0 -263 - -
2017 0 3697 - - - - - - 0 -205 - -
2018 0 -132 - - - - - - 0 -216 - -
Year
Revenue, 
EUR
Net profit, 
EUR
Net profit 
margin
Revenue 
growth
Revenue, 
EUR Net profit, EUR
Net profit 
margin
Revenue 
growth
Revenue, 
EUR
Net profit, 
EUR
Net profit 
margin
Revenue 
growth
2013 599 -970 -161,94%
2014 825 17546 2127% 137433 -253828 -184,69% 22844% 84561 -2900 -3,4%
2015 18001 -70181 -390% 2082% 610098 -548420 -89,89% 344% 432132 8612 2,0% 411%
2016 36122 -105720 -293% 101% 2785322 -49367 -1,77% 357% 1114037 -9467 -0,8% 158%
2017 151002 -174278 -115% 318% 21098843 -11337356 -53,73% 658% 1784969 35350 2,0% 60%
2018 227484 -98232 -43% 51% 79677062 -60371912 -75,77% 278% 2201579 -1234 -0,1% 23%
Ajujaht 2014
Timber Diameter/Timbeter OÜ Taxify/Bolt Technology OÜ GoWorkaBit Estonia OÜ
Ajujaht 2013
KidsOS/ABC123 OÜ Jomi Interactive OÜ PESA Design OÜ
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Appendix 2. Success evaluation of Ajujaht 2008-2014 TOP3 contestants 
 
Year Team/idea What was the idea? Developed 
into a 
business? 
Continues 
to exist? 
Is the core 
idea the 
same? 
Average revenue 
growth, last 3 y. 
Reached 
success? 
2008 CellTells/Flipper Voice-activated interface for calendar apps Yes No - - No 
 Flow Storage space optimisation No No - - No 
 Textmarker* Highlight tool No Yes Yes - No 
2009 Growfish/Primefish Fish farm management system Yes Yes Yes - No 
 ReUse Republic Using fabric leftovers for clothes Yes Yes Yes -100% No 
 Optimistid Wooden speedboats Yes Yes Yes -48% No 
2010 Click&Grow Smart indoor gardening Yes Yes Yes 70% Yes 
 Vetmed Testing equipment for animals Yes No - - No 
 Õpime mängides Educational games Yes No - - No 
2011 Virtual Garden Farming service Yes Yes No 29% No 
 Plaisir du Chat Kitty litter from oil shale dust Yes No - - No 
 KPA Scientific Models for testing hepatitis C Yes Yes No 47% No 
2012 Raybike One-handed scooter Yes Yes Yes -56% No 
 GrillCube Conveniently packed grill coal Yes No - - No 
 Like a Local Guide Recommendations platform for tourists Yes Yes Yes 66% Yes 
2013 Kids OS Children-tracking software No No - - No 
 Jomi Interactive Monitoring water consumption Yes No - - No 
 Pesa Design Shower seats for public showers Yes No - - No 
2014 Timbeter Measuring timber volume Yes Yes Yes 133% Yes 
 Taxify/Bolt Rideshare platform Yes Yes Yes 407% Yes 
 Go Work a Bit Job matching platform Yes Yes Yes 72% Yes 
 
Source: compiled by the author 
 
Contestants participating in this paper are highlighted in yellow. 
* Although Textmarker was not pursued as a business project, the product of their Ajujaht idea is still freely available in the web. 
 64 
Appendix 3. Likert survey for research participants  
 
Statements SHELL category Related factor of failure 
External factors     
There were many competitors. E — Environment Too many competitors 
Competitors were strong/active. E Outcompeted 
It was difficult to attract external investors.  E Investors not found 
The external investments were sufficient. E Lack of funding 
There were political/legal/economic problems when 
developing the business. E 
Political/legal/ 
economic problems 
Sufficient networking was conducted with contacts 
from Ajujaht. E 
Did not use 
networking 
Internal factors     
The original vision of the project has remained the 
same. S — Software 
Loss of the original 
vision 
The business model was good. S No/wrong business model 
The business project was scalable. L2 — Liveware (Organisation) No/wrong scaling 
The business ran out of money. L2 Out of money 
The project ran into organisational issues. L2 Bad management 
The team was assembled optimally. L2 Problems with team 
There were insolvable issues between team members. L2 Co-founder disharmony 
Not enough focus was put on business development. L2 Lack of business development 
There were issues that required a total pivot for the 
company. L2 Failure to pivot 
The pivot(s) were successful. L2 Pivot gone wrong 
Managing the project led to a mental burnout. L2 Burned out 
The motivation to carry on with the project has 
sustained. L2 
Lack of 
passion/motivation 
Development     
The product/service was technically 
feasible/sustainable. H — Hardware 
Technical feasibility/ 
sustainability 
Serious emphasis was put on product development 
during the early phase of the project.  H 
Lost focus on the 
product 
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Sufficient and relevant feedback was gathered from 
(potential) customers. H 
Product did not 
evolve with the 
market 
Did you bring your service/product to the market?     
Product     
There was sufficient demand for the product on the 
market. S 
No product-market 
fit 
The quality of the product/service was good. H Bad quality 
The marketing was effective. S Poor marketing 
The product quickly gained traction. S Poor traction 
There weren’t any pricing issues. S Pricing issues 
The product was released at the right moment. S Mistimed product 
Correct conclusions were made based on customer 
feedback. S Ignored customers 
Customers     
There were not enough customers. L1 — Liveware (Customer) Few customers 
Customer aquisition costs paid off. L1 Problems in customer aquisition 
Customers were loyal. L1 Unfaithful customers 
The geographical expansion was successful. E Failed geographical expansion 
 
Source: compiled by the author 
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Appendix 4. Planned semi-structured interview questions 
 
Research question Theoretical base/reasoning 
1. Was this project your first time as an entrepreneur? 
If not, did it work out the first time? Gottschalk et al (2014)  
2. Did you participate in a competition such as Ajujaht 
beforehand? Howell (2016); McKenzie (2016) 
3. When entering Ajujaht, did you just plan to test the 
idea or did you have intentions of following through 
and making it a business anyway? 
Duchesneau and Gartner (1990); as 
Ajujaht was more of a test platform for 
ideas in the early years, less emphasis 
may have been put into bringing them 
to fruition. 
4. Please describe your idea's course of progress after 
the competition had finished. 
As not all projects have been covered 
by media after the competition, there is 
a gap in background information. 
5. Which gender-age structure characterized your 
team? 
Smith and Viceisza (2017); Poczter 
and Shapsis (2016); Van Gelderen et 
al (2006); Howell (2016); Azoulay et 
al (2018); Carroll and Hannan (2000) 
6. Did you remain true to the business plan you 
presented in Ajujaht? 
Linder and Cantrell (2000), Shirky 
(2008), Teece (2000), to find out 
whether they made any adjustments for 
the sole purpose of winning Ajujaht. 
7. How did you use the award money from Ajujaht? 
Did you invest it in your company? Cooper et al (1994) 
8. How much capital did you need to raise to get the 
business going? Van Gelderen et al (2006) 
9. Were there any foreign investors that were interested 
in your project or was it limited to just Estonian 
investors? 
As Estonia is a country with a small 
media field, start-ups may have limited 
exposure to international investors. 
10. How did you raise the needed capital? Did you 
invest your own finances? How much was needed? Van Gelderen et al (2006) 
11. Did you work on the project full-time or did you 
pursue this besides your regular job? Van Gelderen et al (2006) 
12. Did luck play a part of your success/insuccess or 
was it just hard work/poor decisions that led to the 
current result of your company? Were there any key 
factors that led to the end result? 
Brockhaus (1980); Duchesneau and 
Gartner (1990) 
13. Did you have any doubts whether your doing the 
right thing? What was the level of confidence in your 
business? 
To identify a case of overconfidence, 
perhaps being influenced by praise that 
comes too early and too easily; Rauch 
and Frese (2007) 
14. Did the current result meet your expectations? Duchesneau and Gartner (1990) 
15. What was the milestone where you had an idea 
where you might end up? 
To find out key events/factors that 
determined the outcome of the project. 
16. Did you plan on making a quick cash or were you 
in for the long haul? Did you rush any decisions? Boermans and Willebrands (2017) 
17. How much help did you receive as mentorship 
after the Ajujaht competition? 
Van Gelderen et al (2006); Tipu and 
Arain (2011); Chrisman and 
McMullan (2004) 
Source: compiled by the author 
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Appendix 5. Codes and themes from interview replies 
Categories Flow GrowFish Jomi VetMed Timbeter Click & Grow Like A Local Guide 
Experience in 
entrepreneur-
ship 
No entrepreneur-
ship experience, 
university 
students 
No 
entrepreneurship 
experience, 
university, 
considerable fish 
farming and IT 
experience 
No 
entrepreneurship 
experience, 
university 
students 
No 
entrepreneurship 
experience, 
some field 
experience 
Entrepreneurship 
experience, IT 
field and timber 
industry 
experience 
Entrepreneurship 
experience, IT 
field experience, 
experience of 
failure 
Entrepreneurship 
experience (of 
sorts), sales 
experience, 
designing 
experience 
Experience in 
competitions First competition First competition 
Participation in 
unversity 
competitions, 
Garage48 
experience 
First competition 
First 
competition, 
Garage48 
experience 
First 
competition, 
applied for 
Estonian 
Development 
Fund support 
First competition, 
Enterprise Estonia 
refusal, from 
Ajujaht directly to 
other programs 
Motivation 
Had an idea, 
wanted to pursue 
it 
Came from 
necessity 
Had an idea, saw 
potential 
Had an idea, saw 
potential 
Came from 
necessity in 
Garage48 
Had a thought for 
a while, put to 
work during 
recession  
Had associated 
businesses, saw a 
rising trend 
Education University students 
University 
students and 
graduates 
University 
students  
Graduates and 
student Graduates Graduate Graduates 
Age/gender 
structure 
during 
founding/ 
early stages 
2M, ages 24-25 1F/4M, ages 23-26 
1F/3M, ages 25-
27 
1F/2M ages 23-
24M, 32F 
50%/50% F/M, 
average age 33 
1M, age 34, 
afterwards 
50%/50% F/M, 
average age 30 
1F/1M, ages 29-
31 
 
Source: compiled by the author
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Categories Flow GrowFish Jomi VetMed Timbeter Click & Grow Like A Local Guide 
Effect of 
age/experience 
Full of unjustified 
confidence, did 
not know what we 
were doing 
Bad decisions 
due to bad 
judgement and 
inexperience 
No experience, 
hasty decisions 
Automatically 
assumed that we 
need older experts by 
our side, frightened 
by the scale of 
investments needed 
 
Plenty of 
experience to 
realizing an old 
idea 
Had time to figure 
out what we’d 
like to achieve 
Funding 
Had one potential 
Estonian investor, 
wanted 95%, gave 
up the last minute, 
recession, no 
interest from 
abroad 
Did not want 
investors before 
having a tested 
product, had 
some interest 
from Estonia, 
funded from 
award money and 
personal funds 
Did not want 
investors, were 
looking for a 
partner, no 
interest from 
Estonia, funded 
from award 
money and 
personal funds, 
big interest from 
potential 
customers/ 
partners abroad 
Did not want 
investors, wanted to 
keep shares during 
early stages, funding 
from projects, some 
interest from 
European investors 
Initially 
Estonian 
business 
angels, 
international 
investors 
afterwards 
Initially Estonian 
business angels, 
mainly 
international 
investors 
afterwards, 
Kickstarter 
Initially Estonian 
investors, an 
international 
investor 
afterwards 
Need for 
funds 
Does not 
remember, not 
huge numbers 
Not that much Not that much Big Big Big Big 
Issues with 
outside 
experts 
Never got that far 
Issues with 
hardware 
developer 
Issues with 
Academy of 
Arts students 
Issues with TalTech 
partners 
Issues with 
external 
software 
developers 
Issues with 
hardware 
components 
Issues with 
retaining the tech 
employee 
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Categories Flow GrowFish Jomi VetMed Timbeter Click & Grow Like A Local Guide 
Product 
development Made blueprints 
Hardware and 
reliability issues, first 
make it happen, then 
break it out 
Hardware and 
reliability 
issues 
Some 
components 
needed that 
were not 
available at the 
time, first make 
it happen, then 
break it out 
 Validated step-
by-step with 
customers early 
on in the 
development 
process 
Hardware issues, 
had to make it 
simpler 
Software issues, 
first make it 
happen, then 
break it out 
Business 
plan 
Never got to 
pursuing it, was 
unrealistic 
Did not change Changed the target group Did not change Did not change 
Changed the core 
source of income 
A feature just for 
Ajujaht, changed a 
lot, came back to 
the initial plan, 
changed the 
income source 
often 
(Potential) 
Customers 
Some interest in 
Estonia 
There was interest, 
could not fail not even 
one customer, 
otherwise no 
additional customers, 
had to have sales in 
home market to 
succeed abroad 
Strong interest 
from big 
companies 
abroad 
Not enough 
interest, too 
expensive  
Feedback from 
Estonia not 
good, now 99% 
of revenue 
abroad 
Had to educate 
people to 
generate 
customers 
Monetizing too 
quickly - pushing 
people away, 
monitored 
different 
customer-related 
metrics 
Competitors 
A German 
company offered a 
similar product 
soon after our 
failure. 
Little competition, 
specific field 
Initially not 
many, but 
others started 
developing 
around the 
same period 
Human tests 
were a growing 
business, but no 
competitors for 
livestock tests 
No competitors 
Others focus on 
gimmicks and 
unnecessary bits 
Strong sector, big 
international 
players 
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Categories Flow GrowFish Jomi VetMed Timbeter Click & Grow Like A Local Guide 
Confidence 
level High 
Got higher as 
time went by, 
motivation 
boosted by 
mentors 
Had some 
doubts, 
emotional roller-
coaster 
Not very high, 
hence the 
involvement of 
TalTech people 
Low, lots of 
doubts 
Quite high in 
decisions being 
made 
High in general, 
lower regarding 
particular 
decisions 
External 
influences Recession 
Setbacks in 
family business in 
2010 
    
 Legislation 
issues in 
different markets 
Coronavirus Coronavirus 
Time 
management Short-lived 
Used up valuable 
time failing with 
prototypes 
Used up 
valuable time for 
failing with 
prototypes, 
things were not 
done in time 
Delayed 
decisions 
Took way more 
time than 
expected, had 
prepared for a 
long process 
Took a lot of 
time to get on the 
market, hardware 
product with a 
bio component, 
testing took a lot 
of time 
Took time to think 
initially, then 
hurried to 
monetize, took a 
lot of time to work 
out the income 
source 
Dedication Work, university 
Helping a family 
company, 
university 
Other projects as 
well, work, 
university 
Other projects as 
well, work 
100% with this 
project after a 
couple of months 
100% with this 
project 
80% with this 
project, no 
hardcore 
multitasking 
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Categories Flow GrowFish Jomi VetMed Timbeter Click & Grow Like A Local Guide 
Personal 
matters   
Family company 
had a severe 
business loss in 
2010, solving it 
was prioritized 
over Growfish 
Worn out 
 Involved with 
other projects in 
later stages 
  Worn out Worn out 
Expectations Wanted to see how it will go 
Big expectations 
as potential was 
big, was not met 
but not 
surprising, did 
not have business 
experience 
Big 
expectations, 
big-named 
contacts were 
interested 
End result met 
the prerequisites   
Extremely big 
expectations, 
haven't met yet 
No expectations 
Milestones Investment got pulled 
Setbacks in 
family business in 
2010 
Losing tech 
employee 
Realizing the 
price issue 
Customer 
feedback, being a 
solution of 
critical 
importance 
Customer 
feedback, 
successful 
Kickstarter 
campaign 
Realizing we do 
not know how to 
continue, burnout, 
selling it 
Role of 
Ajujaht 
Contacts, went 
and asked 
themselves, 
adjusted business 
plan 
Contacts, found a 
hardware 
developer, 
mentors 
recommended to 
sell an untested 
product 
Exposure, used 
contacts, 
adjusted 
business plan 
Exposure, did 
not use contacts 
Contacts, 
funding 
Contacts, 
prototype 
funding, 
exposure, tech 
advice 
Contacts, advice, 
exposure, creating 
confusion 
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Categories Flow GrowFish Jomi VetMed Timbeter Click & Grow Like A Local Guide 
What was 
missing? 
A more realistic 
business plan, 
money, 
tech/engineer 
advice, how to 
take maximum of 
the advice 
Motivation and 
time, 
tech/engineer 
advice (although 
it was 
outsourced), 
support system 
for our product 
how to take 
maximum of the 
advice 
Tech/engineer 
advice, 
experience, time 
and commitment 
Better business 
plan, customer-
specific advice, 
experience 
    
No independence 
when working 
with investors' 
funding, knowing 
what to make of 
others' advice, 
courage 
Key factors Ran out of money, recession 
Personal matters, 
changed priorities 
Changed market 
situation, 
difficulties in 
development 
process, penny-
pinching (partner 
selection) 
Partner selection 
gone wrong; 
product too 
expensive for 
customers 
Not giving up 
World-class 
people, 
conductor’s 
background 
Personal matters, 
lack of knowledge 
and ideas, letting 
others tell what to 
do 
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Appendix 6. Possible factors of business failure based on ex-post studies. 
Possible factor of failure Importance 
SHELL — Software 
 No/Wrong business 
model  
(Cantamessa et al 2018, 
The TOP 20… 2019, 
Bednár and Tarišková 
2017) 
Business model describes how organisation offers value for customers 
and captures part of it to generate profits (Osterwalder and Pigneur 
2010). Although a basis for value creation, firms need to change it as the 
core logic for operating a firm changes over time in order to stay 
profitable (Linder and Cantrell 2000). The right model is rarely clear 
early on in new/innovative sectors: entrepreneurs who have a good—
although an imperfect business model—but who are pro-learning and 
can make it evolve, are more likely to succeed (Shirky 2008; Teece 
2000).  
 No product/market fit  
(Cantamessa et al 2018, 
The TOP 20… 2019, 
Bednár and Tarišková 
2017) 
No market need. Missing product/market fit damages the product/service 
and the success of the business model. Marc Andreessen (2007) has 
defined product/market fit as being in a good market with a product that 
can satisfy that market. On the opposite, wrong positioning implies 
wrong knowledge of the product/service with consequent bad 
performance or the risk to begin in the “stuck in the middle” position of 
Porter’s generic strategies (Porter 1980).  
Loss of the original vision  
(Cantamessa et al 2018) 
If founders are too focused on the product and its technical 
improvement, they may end up losing their initial vision and customer 
orientation and fail to address other side-lined issues.  
Wrong customer 
development (Cantamessa 
et al 2018) 
Customer segments have specific needs, behaviour, and willingness to 
pay for the product or service. Thus, it is important to decide about the 
ones to serve to aim the marketing correctly. A good product or service 
sold to the wrong segment will not lead to success.  
Poor marketing 
(Cantamessa et al 2018, 
The TOP 20… 2019) 
Marketing is about knowing your target audience and knowing how to 
get their attention and to convert them to leads and ultimately customers 
(The TOP 20… 2019). Lacking knowledge means lacking in customers. 
No traction (Cantamessa 
et al 2018) 
Having traction means the start-up already has created signs of market 
interest. Insufficient traction implies the start-up is unable to grow at 
sufficient speed, therefore giving up the competitive advantage and/or 
interest by investors and stakeholders.  
Pricing/cost issues  
(The TOP 20… 2019, 
Bednár and Tarišková 
2017)  
The difficulty lies in pricing a product high enough to eventually cover 
costs but low enough to bring in customers (The TOP 20… 2019). 
Mistimed product  
(The TOP 20… 2019, 
Bednár and Tarišková 
2017) 
An early or late product release might lead to poor response from 
potential customers. 
Ignored customers  
(The TOP 20… 2019, 
Bednár and Tarišková 
(2017) 
This can either mean a failure of listening to customers, responding to 
their feedback or making improvements based on their feedback. As 
retaining a customer is cheaper than acquiring a new customer, customer 
engagement is vital. 
SHELL — Hardware 
Lost focus on the product  
(Cantamessa et al 2018) Insufficient attention was paid to product development.  
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Technical feasibility/ 
sustainability 
(Cantamessa et al 2018) 
Issues related to the product’s technical feasibility that were already 
initially ignored or have emerged during the development process, 
making it impossible to design and develop the product/service.  
Bad quality (Cantamessa 
et al 2018, The TOP 20… 
2019, Bednár and 
Tarišková 2017) 
General problems with the product, its quality and usability.  
Product did not evolve 
with the market 
(Cantamessa et al 2018) 
The product or service still fulfils its original need and does not fit with 
the changed customers’ needs.  
SHELL — Environment 
 Outcompeted 
(Cantamessa et al 2018, 
The TOP 20… 2019, 
Bednár and Tarišková 
2017)  
Start-ups’ competitors may have a consolidated positioning with a 
relevant market share, distribution channels or technologies, resources or 
other assets.  
Too many competitors 
(Cantamessa et al 2018) 
High number of existing competitors may keep newcomers from gaining 
a relevant position in a fragmented market.  
Investors not found 
(Cantamessa et al 2018, 
The TOP 20… 2019, 
Bednár and Tarišková 
2017) 
There can be a lack of investors’ interest either at the seed stage or none 
at all. This could be due to a poor presentation of the product or service 
offered or connected, or linked to one of the previous categories.  
Lack of funding 
(Cantamessa et al 2018) 
Start-ups deal with the problem of raising insufficient amounts of 
investments, which are not enough for developing a business. 
Political/ economic/ legal 
problems (Cantamessa et 
al 2018, The TOP 20… 
2019) 
The political and economic situation affects start-ups’ success through 
regulations or economic conditions, either directly or through customer 
base. If the chosen field is filled with legal challenges, it can cause start-
up failure due to the high legal expenditures.  
Did not use networking  
(The TOP 20… 2019) 
Importance of networks lies in the possibility to consult, find employees, 
and most importantly, to contact new potential investors. 
 Failed geographical 
expansion  
(The TOP 20… 2019) 
This includes expanding for the wrong reasons (just for compensating 
the scant revenue in home market), underestimating the costs and the 
extra complexity of expanding abroad, and inadequate localisation 
efforts. 
SHELL — Liveware (customer, L1) 
Few customers 
(Cantamessa et al 2018) 
This factor especially relates to wrong positioning, the maturity of the 
market and the competition. All these reasons could mean reaching to 
only a small part of customers; insufficient for the sustainability of the 
business.  
 Problems in customer 
acquisition (Cantamessa 
et al 2018) 
Wrong marketing efforts could mean high costs to acquire customers, 
that do not reflect on the number of acquired customers.  
Unfaithful customers 
(Cantamessa et al 2018) 
The customers have become more conscious of and attracted to the 
promotions offered by the competitors, increasing the level of 
competition and the risk of a war of prices that make customers’ loyalty 
fragile.  
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SHELL — Liveware (organization, L2) 
Out of money 
(Cantamessa et al 2018, 
The TOP 20… 2019, 
Bednár and Tarišková 
2017) 
This reason may correlate to one or more of the previous categories, 
either due to bad management of the resources and investments, or due 
to bad business development, wrong customers, market study and so 
forth.  
No/Wrong scaling 
(Cantamessa et al 2018) 
The decision to scale could lead to failure, either due to a difficult pivot 
or a premature scaling, or to a higher working capital requirement than 
the scaling operation needs.  
Bad organization 
management (Cantamessa 
et al 2018) 
The start-up founders often have specific knowledge of their field, which 
makes for a good product, but they lack the business and management 
skills. Rules, roles, and tasks need to be well organized and assigned to 
make the business side work smoothly.  
Problems with team 
(Cantamessa et al 2018, 
The TOP 20… 2019, 
Bednár and Tarišková 
2017) 
Good team can make a business. If the team does not work together, has 
wrong skills or is poorly motivated, it will cause issues in the long run. 
Co-founder disharmony 
(Cantamessa et al 2018, 
The TOP 20… 2019, 
Bednár and Tarišková 
2017) 
Co-founders disagree due to different backgrounds, qualifications, and 
specializations, which can cause bad decisions and management.  
Lack of business 
development (Cantamessa 
et al 2018, The TOP 20… 
2019, Bednár and 
Tarišková (2017) 
The highly technical teams risk having poor business development and 
thus, a poor commercial perspective of increasing customers, sales and 
profits, and making the business more profitable and self-perpetuating. 
 Failure to pivot 
(Cantamessa et al 2018, 
The TOP 20… 2019, 
Bednár and Tarišková 
2017) 
This means not moving away (quickly enough) from a bad product, hire 
or decision. Being attached to a bad idea drains resources and leaves 
employees frustrated by a lack of progress. (The TOP 20… 2019)  
Pivot went wrong  
(The TOP 20… 2019, 
Bednár and Tarišková 
2017) 
Sorting out many fundamental issues still does not guarantee success.  
Burned out (The TOP 
20… 2019, Bednár and 
Tarišková 2017) 
Start-up founders are often multi-tasking everything, at least in the 
beginning. Distributing tasks is hard when it is too expensive to hire 
additional people. This can eventually lead to fatigue and loss of 
motivation. 
Lack of passion/ 
motivation (The TOP 
20… 2019, Bednár and 
Tarišková 2017) 
Staying motivated is the primary in entrepreneur’s ability to get things 
done. Passion is important because it can fuel motivation, mental activity 
and provide meaning to everyday work (Cardon 2008). 
 
Source: Based on Cantamessa et al (2018), The TOP 20… 2019; Bednár and Tarišková (2017); 
additional insights by Andreessen (2007), Shirky (2008); Teece (2000), Linder and Cantrell 
(2000), (Porter 1980), Cardon (2008), Osterwalder and Pigneur (2010); additional insights 
added by the author. 
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Appendix 7.  Description of non-participating Ajujaht winners. 
 
Year Team Description 
2008 Text-
marker 
Third place winner was team Textmarker, with the idea of a browser 
tool that allows to highlight and share important information on any 
website being browsed. They finished a browser add-on tool 
Marker.to, that is still downloadable. As a freeware, it never took off 
as a business project. 
2009 Optimistid 
/ Eurus 
Powerboats 
OÜ 
Third place winner of the 2009 season was a solo venture called 
Optimistid with the idea of hand building wooden speedboats that 
would have the characteristics comparable to race boats. The person 
behind the project still appears to be making/restoring boats according 
to social media; but it does not reflect on annual business reports. 
2010 Õpime 
mängides 
Third place winner Õpime Mängides designed different activities and 
game sets for studying while playing in elementary schools. Although 
their game sets were sold in large retail stores, it never took off as a 
business project and the company was sold in 2016/2017. Some of the 
team members are now using their expertise to train new teachers 
2011 Plaisir du 
Chat 
The second place went to team for their idea to produce kitty litter 
from oil shale dust. They tested machinery for their production line, 
but stopped pursuing their idea soon after. According to a founding 
member, it was due to a chemical process that rendered the product 
useless (Hälvin 2020). The company was shut down in 2019 after a 
period of hibernation.  
2011 KPA 
Scientific 
The third-place winner was KPA Scientific, for developing in vivo 
models for testing hepatitis C in pre-clinical phase. According to Plaas 
(2020), the idea was killed soon afterwards when HCV treatment 
entered to the market, which in turn cut the research support and 
investments. 
2012 Raybike The winner for 2012 season was team Raybike, which developed a 
scooter with a joystick-like lever for steering. This team was actively 
promoting their product right after the finale of Ajujaht, which lead to 
a small profit, some export sales to Finland and the Netherlands and 
Expo 2015 participation in the Estonian pavilion. Nevertheless, by 
2016 sales were essentially non-existent and by the end of 2017 all 
public activities had also stopped. 
2012 GrillCube The second-place winner in 2012 was team GrillCube, which offered a 
convenient way of using charcoal for grilling. Their product was a 
single-use cardboard box filled with charcoal ready to be lit without 
any charcoal lighter fluid. The original founders sold their company 
after three years of volatile business; they managed to reach the 
markets of Central Europe, Western Europe and Australia while 
generating sales and profit. The new owners have boosted the sales 
figures by 1000% by selling firewood to export markets, a market 
sector where the new owners have considerable experience. 
2013 KidsOS 2013 seasons’ winner was KidsOS, an Android-based child tracking 
system. The team decided to invest their prize money to Apple shares 
and cryptocurrency. The team members have not pursued any further 
KidsOS-related activities. 
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2013 PESA Third place in 2013 went to PESA, a multifunctional children’s shower 
seat for public showers. After market research in 2013 and the 
following patent issues, no other activities have been reported of. 
 
2014 Bolt 
(Taxify) 
The second-place winner was Taxify, now known as Bolt. Their idea 
was to create an international rideshare platform. Although the jury 
decided to vote them out of the competition in an early phase, they 
were reinstated in the competition by the finals. Probably the best-
known investor in Bolt is Daimler, whose 175 million USD investment 
moved Bolt to the so-called “unicorn club”, a term for start-ups valued 
over one billion dollars. It now operates in more than 30 countries as a 
transport and delivery service and has more than 25 million clients and 
over a million drivers (Press – Bolt Technology 2020). 
2014 Go Work 
A Bit 
The third place in 2014 went to GoWorkaBit, a platform for 
intermediating short-period work opportunities. It is now a partner for 
many companies in Estonia that need seasonal workforce. It generated 
a revenue of 2.2 million euros in 2018. They are currently preparing to 
enter foreign markets. 
 
Source: Estonian Business Registry, compiled by the author
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